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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In addition to the issues raised by Utah Power in its Brief 
of Appellants, Price has raised issues in his Brief of 
Respondent. The issues are: 
1. Is this Court precluded from reviewing a denial of a 
motion for a new trial based upon the failure of the trial court 
to submit an additional voir dire question to the jury panel 
where the movant made a reasoned request that a specific question 
be asked, the trial court denied the request, and the movant 
later filed a timely Rule 59 motion based on that denial? 
2. Is this Court precluded from reviewing a denial of a 
motion for a new trial based upon the insufficiency of the 
causation evidence to justify the verdict where the movant filed 
a timely Rule 59 motion based on that ground? 
Utah Power also replies to Price's arguments on the issues 
initially raised by Utah Power: 
3. Did the plaintiff, who called no doctor to testify, 
present adequate evidence to make a prima facie case of medical 
causation between an 8-10 second mule ride and the nerve 
entrapments in his neck and elbow, and did the trial court abuse 
its discretion in failing to grant a new trial on this issue? 
4. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in refusing 
to question jury panel members about possible prejudice against 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Utah Power from layoffs and unemployment in the coal mining 
industry and in refusing to grant a new trial on this issue, and 
did such errors violate Utah Power's constitutional right to due 
process in a civil jury trial? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Utah Power respectfully disagrees with certain factual 
statements made by Price in the Brief of Respondent: 
1. Price states that chiropractor Thayn, who treated Price 
for neck problems before the mule incident, diagnosed his 
condition as a "thorasic sprain" (Brief of Respondent, p. 3). In 
fact, the complete diagnosis was much more serious, encompassing 
the nerve problems shown by the grip test: "traumatic cervical 
thorasic (sic) sprain, severe, with brachial neurology, (sic) 
bilaterally" (Tr. 211)(emphasis added). 
2. While discussing the treatment given to Price by 
chiropractor Sanders before the mule incident (Brief of 
Respondent, p. 4), Price fails to mention that the spinal 
manipulations given starting in July of 1978 were meant "to 
re-establish normal joint motion" in the neck (Tr. 163)(emphasis 
added). 
3. Price states that in December of 1981 (2% months after 
the mule incident), a deterioration of his right hand was noted 
by chiropractor Sanders (Brief of Respondent, p. 4-5). This is 
true. Price also suggests incorrectly that there was a 
connection between the condition complained of on 16 September 
1981 and the deterioration noted in December. There is 
absolutely no support for this in the transcript. In fact, 
Sanders was asked by counsel for Price: 
Q. Did you have any opinion as to the cause of 
that condition? 
A. I did not. I was wanting to — That's why 
I was referring him (Tr. 176). 
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4. Price asserts: 
Other than Appellant's repeated reference to 
injury to Mr. Price's right arm there is no evidence 
that his right arm was injured, diagnosed as injured 
or treated for injury prior to September 15, 1981 
(Brief of Respondent, p. 6). 
This is simply not true. X-rays taken of the right elbow just 
before the February 1982 surgery showed degenerative joint 
disease with arthritic changes and deformity consistent with old 
trauma. See Addendum, pp. A4 and A6. Also, the discharge 
summary from the 1977 horse-kick accident (Addendum, p. A3) 
clearly states that the right ulna was fractured, although Utah 
Power has previously conceded this may be in error. 
5. Price states that there was a jury panel of 3 8 (Brief 
of Respondent, p. 6). It is true that the court may have 
summoned 38 for jury duty, but only 25 panel members were paid, 
indicating that only 25 appeared for the trial. This list has 
now been made a part of the record (R. 267-68) . See Addendum, 
pp. A7, A8. This number is consistent with the trial court's 
comments about running out of jurors (Tr. 34). It took 24 of the 
25 panel members to seat the jury — the 20 that appear on the 
jury list (R. 124) plus the four Utah Power-related people (Ryan, 
Lancaster, Block and Mathie) who were excused before the names 
were read for the jury list (Tr. 5, 6). 
6. Price states that Utah Power failed to move for a 
directed verdict on the ground of insufficient causation evidence 
(Brief of Respondent, p. 9). Counsel for Utah Power, however, 
made his motion for a directed verdict with these words: 
At this time the Defendants would move for a directed 
verdict on the basis of inadequate evidence to 
support a claim of negligence against either Mr. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Zserai or Utah Power and Light Company (Tr. 110) 
(emphasis added). 
Price's Complaint (R. 1-3), which can be described as a claim of 
negligence, contains elements of negligent conduct, causation, 
and damages. It is true that the argument that followed on the 
motion for directed verdict (Tr. 110-112) focused on the issue of 
negligent conduct, but the actual statement of the motion can be 
read broadly to cover inadequate evidence on all elements of a 
claim of negligence — including causation. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court is not precluded from reviewing the new trial 
issues presented on this appeal. Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure does not require the taking of an exception to 
the trial court's ruling that refused additional voir dire 
questions. All that is required procedurally is a reasoned 
request for a specific question and a timely Rule 59 motion for a 
new trial based on the refusal of the request. This was done. 
Utah law also does not require the making of a directed 
verdict motion to perfect a Rule 59(a) (6) motion for a new trial 
based on insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. 
Even if the motion for a directed verdict actually made here was 
not specific enough to cover the causation evidence, case 
authority in Utah says that for purposes of appellate review, the 
new trial motion is equivalent to a directed verdict motion. The 
new trial motion was made, and this Court has authority to 
consider the appeal on its merits. 
Price's arguments on the merits fail to adequately refute 
these propositions: 
1. Price needed expert medical causation testimony from 
doctors who could give their "best judgment to a reasonable 
certainty"; 
2. He did not present such testimony; and 
3. Utah law requires the trial court to have been more 
diligent in screening the panel for bias where testimony from 
panel members demonstrated the potential for such bias in the 
community. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
This Court Is Not Precluded from Reviewing 
the Denial of the Motion for a New Trial Based 
Upon the Failure of the Trial Court to Submit an 
Additional Voir Dire Question to the Jury Panel Because 
Utah Power Has Taken All Necessary Steps to Raise 
the Issue, Including a Reasoned Request for a 
Specific Question and a Timely Rule 59 Motion 
Based on the Denial of that Request 
Price claims, without supporting authority, that Utah Power 
had no right to seek a new trial based on the inadequate voir 
dire of the jury because Utah Power (1) requested a jury trial, 
(2) anticipated that some jurors would be biased, (3) made no 
motion for change of venue, (4) did not object to the trial 
court's rejection of the additional voir dire question, (5) 
challenged no individual juror for cause, and (6) passed the jury 
for cause. (Brief of Respondent, pp. 10-11). None of these 
items is a prerequisite for the making of such a new trial 
motion. 
Generally speaking, Rule 59 (see Addendum, p. All) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a new trial may be 
granted to any party for a number of specified grounds. No 
preconditions or prerequisites are attached, including those six 
enumerated above. 
(1) Jury request. Price suggests that a party who requests 
a jury trial forfeits the right to seek a new trial if the first 
jury was not screened properly for bias. Such a rule makes no 
sense, attaches an unfair penalty for requesting a jury and is 
not required by Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(trial by jury) , section 78-21-1 of the Utah Code (right to jury 
trial) , or Rules 38 (jury trial of right) or 59 (new trial) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) Anticipation of bias. Price also suggests that if a 
party who requests a trial by jury anticipates that some members 
of the jury panel may be biased, he forfeits the right to seek a 
new trial if the trial court does not adequately screen for such 
bias. This suggestion suffers from the same defects as the 
first. After all, the voir dire process accepts bias as a fact 
of life and aims at substantially eliminating it. 
(3) Change of venue. Price next suggests that a denied 
motion for change of venue is a prerequisite for seeking a new 
trial for a voir dire error. First, this presumes that the 
movant would have adequate proof to establish that "an impartial 
trial cannot be had in the county . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-13-9(2) (1977), a difficult standard indeed. Second and more 
important, why should a party be penalized for believing that the 
trial judge can skillfully screen panel members for impartiality? 
Utah Power is not claiming that every juror was biased, only that 
the screening process was unfair and prejudicial. Nothing in the 
venue statutes or new trial rules requires a venue motion in this 
case. 
(4) Objection to ruling denying request. Price states that 
Utah Power should have objected or taken exception to the trial 
court's ruling that denied Utah Power's request for a specific 
voir dire question. This is answered by Rule 46 (see Addendum, 
p. A9) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which rejects an 
older, more formalized practice: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the 
court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a 
party, at the time the ruling or order of the court 
is made or sought, makes known to the court the 
action which he desires the court to take or his 
objection to the action of the court and his ground 
therefor . . . . 
Utah Power satisfied Rule 46 by making known to the court the 
action it desired the court to take (ask jury panel a question 
about bias from layoffs at Emery Mining) and the ground therefor 
(layoffs at Emery Mining and connection between Utah Power and 
Emery Mining) at the time the*ruling was sought (Tr. 42). To 
require an exception to the court's refusal to submit the voir 
dire question would be purposeless, as well as time-consuming 
and argumentative. 
(5) Challenge for cause. Price would also require a 
challenge for cause to all or some of the jurors before a new 
trial could be requested for improper bias screening. This is 
not required by Rule 47(f) (challenges for cause) or Rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and also makes no sense. How 
can a party challenge a juror for an improper state of mind when 
the court has not allowed that mind to be adequately explored? 
There is no challenge for cause where an improper state of mind 
2 is only suspected of existing. 
(6) Passing jury for cause. Finally, Price contends that 
by passing the jury for cause, Utah Power waived its right to 
seek a new trial for improper bias screening. This is simply an 
extension of the previous claim and can be answered the same. 
Super. 289, 444 A.2d 1179 
Civil Procedure. 
Commonwealth v. Holland, 298 Pa. 
(1982). 
2See Rule 47(f)(6), Utah Rules of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In conclusion, Rules 46 and 5 9 simply require a reasoned 
request for a specific voir dire question and a timely new trial 
motion based upon the denial of the request. These have been 
done, and this Court is not precluded from reviewing the order 
denying a new trial. 
POINT 2 
This Court Is Not Precluded from Reviewing 
the Denial of the Motion for a New Trial Based 
Upon the Insufficiency of the Causation Evidence 
to Justify the Verdict Because Utah Power Has Taken 
the Only Step Needed to Raise the Issue — 
the Timely Filing of a Rule 59 Motion 
Rules 50 and 59 (see Addendum, pp. A10, All) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the making of a motion 
for a directed verdict in order to later move for a new trial on 
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict. The only consequence of failing to ask the judge to 
take the matter away from the jury is the inability to later 
3 
request a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
It makes little sense to have a new trial dependent on a 
directed verdict motion because the two motions are based on 
4 different standards of justification. A directed verdict 
should be granted to a defendant only when the evidence is such 
that reasonable men could not arrive at a verdict for the 
plaintiff while viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
Rule 50(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Addendum, 
p. A10. 
4 
11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2806 
(1973) . Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to the plaintiff. A much less stringent standard applies to the 
granting of a new trial on the ground of insufficient evidence to 
support the verdict. The court may properly grant such a motion 
if the record has substantial competent evidence to support a 
verdict for the defendant, even if reasonable men could arrive at 
a verdict for the plaintiff. Thusf a trial judge has the 
discretion to grant a defendant a new trial if a different jury 
might reasonably have decided in favor of either party, whereas 
the same judge, on the same evidence, would be precluded from 
directing a verdict for the defendant unless a verdict in his 
favor was the only reasonable conclusion. 
Utah case law does not condition a new trial on the making 
of a directed verdict motion. Although old, the case of Foxley 
7 
v, Gallagher squarely decides this issue with reasoning that 
has continuing vitality. Foxley was a personal injury action 
where the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Several 
defendants appealed, based on the insufficiency of the evidence 
to justify the verdict, without having first moved for a nonsuit 
or a directed verdict. Their motion for a new trial had been 
denied. This Court reversed and remanded for a new trial with 
the following explanation: 
Notwithstanding appellants omitted to move for a 
nonsuit or request a directed verdict, they did, 
nevertheless, move for a new trial on several 
grounds, one of which was insufficiency of the 
See Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432, 434 
(1973) . 
See Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982). 
755 Utah 298, 185 P. 775 (1919). 
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evidence to justify the verdict. That was equivalent 
to a request for a directed verdict and should have 
the same effect on appeal. 
The Court rejected the holdings to the contrary from Oregon and 
Oklahoma. 
The adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure bolsters 
Foxley because there is no express requirement of a directed 
verdict motion in the new trial provisions (Rule 59) (see 
Addendum, p. All), only in the judgment NOV provisions (Rule 
50(b)) (see Addendum, p. A10). Foxley has been cited as good 
authority in Montana when statutory new trial rules similar to 
9 
our present rules were in effect and in Arizona under Rule 59 
of Arizona's rules of civil procedure. No Utah case since 
Foxley has changed the rule. 
185 P. at 776-77. 
9Adami v. Murphy, 118 Mont. 172, 164 P.2d 150, 154 (1945). 
Singleton v. Valianos, 84 Ariz. 51, 323 P.2d 697, 698 
(1958) . 
The Court appears to have erred in footnote 1 of Pollesche 
v. Transamerican Insurance Co., 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 P.2d 236, 238 
(1972), a case where the Court reviewed the trial courtfs denial 
of a plaintiff's motions for new trial and judgment NOV. The 
Court states that the failure of a party to make a motion for a 
directed verdict precludes the appellate court from reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. In support 
of this, the Court cites Rule 50(b) (judgments NOV) and Brigham 
v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 (1970), 
a case where the plaintiff made neither a motion for directed 
verdict nor a motion for new trial. Despite its placement and 
some contrary language, the Court apparently intended footnote 1 
to cover only motions for judgment NOV (one of the grounds of 
appeal) because it concluded the footnote with this sentence: 
"Consequently, plaintiff may not allege error on the part of the 
trial court in its denial of the motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict." (emphasis added). The Court 
continues after footnote 1 to devote itself to the merits of the 
new trial ruling. This would have been completely unnecessary if 
the Court were deciding that it was precluded from reviesw. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pricefs authorities do not hit the mark: 
12 1# Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. — A case 
involving the failure to object to evidence, a situation where 
the court could have taken corrective action if requested at 
trial. That situation is governed by different rules and is not 
analogous. 
2. Deer Valley Industrial Park Development & Lease Co. v. 
13 State — An Arizona Court of Appeals case that does not require 
a motion for directed verdict. It appears to be based on a 
claimed failure of the condemnees to object to certain jury 
instructions on the method of determining value. The preclusion 
language is dicta, the court having reviewed the denial of the 
new trial motion. 
14 
3. Agranoff v. Morton — A Washington case apparently 
not decided under rules patterned after the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The case is contrary to Utah's Foxley decision 
and should be considered rejected just as the Oregon and Oklahoma 
cases were rejected in Foxley. 
Moore suggests that Utah's approach is the better one for 
those jurisdictions following the federal pattern: 
It is to be noted that a party who has not moved 
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence 
is precluded from moving later for a judgment n.o.v. 
There is some authority for the proposition that 
having neglected to move for a directed verdict, the 
party is also precluded from relying on insufficiency 
of the evidence in a motion for a new trial. There 
is no more than scant textual authority for this 
holding, inasmuch as a motion for a new trial, not 
12682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). 
135 Ariz. App. 150, 424 P.2d 192 (1967). 
1454 Wash. 2d 341, 340 P.2d 811 (1959). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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coupled with a motion for judgment n.o.v., is 
governed by Rule 59 rather than Rule 50, and Rule 59 
does not make a motion for a directed verdict a 
precondition to a motion for a new trial. Further, 
the requirement of this precondition in the case of a 
motion for judgment n.o.v. was derived from Seventh 
Amendment considerations not relevant to the motion 
for a new trial. The most recent court of appeals 
decisions have recognized that such a requirement 
should not be read into Rule 59 to preclude a just 
determination of the merits of a controversy because 
of a procedural mistake. 
Utah Power contends that it did move for a directed verdict 
on the basis of inadequate causation evidence because such was 
encompassed within the statement that the evidence to support a 
"claim of negligence" was inadequate (Tr. 110; see point 6, pages 
4, 5). Even if this is considered inadequately specific to 
amount to a valid motion on the causation issue, the Utah rules, 
Utah case law, and betteir-reasoned authorities from other 
jurisdictions support the proposition that no such motion is 
required before making a Rule 59(a) (6) motion. 
POINT 3 
The Plaintiff, Who Called No Doctor to 
Testify, Failed to Present Adequate Evidence 
to Make a Prima Facie Case of Medical Causation 
between the 8-10 Second Mule Ride and the Nerve 
Entrapments in his Neck and Elbow, and the Trial 
Court Abused its Discretion in Refusing to 
Grant a New Trial on this Issue 
(A Reply to Respondent's Point II) 
Utah Power accepts the fact that the standard of review of a 
denial of a new trial motion under Rule 59(a) (6) is a high one 
and that this Court will reverse only if the evidence to support 
the verdict was "completely lacking or was so slight and 
6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice f 59.04 [5] at 59-22 
(1984) . 
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unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust." Because expert causation testimony should have been 
required in this case, the causation evidence was completely 
lacking or so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust. 
Utah Power agrees that certain lay testimony relating to 
injuries may be admissible; the real issue is whether such 
admitted testimony is sufficient to satisfy the causation element 
of the case. Price's cases on this issue do not help him here: 
17 
1. Barnett v. Richardson — An Oklahoma case that simply 
says that a layperson is competent to testify about his pains and 
treatments. 
18 
2. Marsh v. Irvine — A case that states there was no 
error in rulings on the admissibility of police testimony on 
certain accident reconstruction issues. The discretion of the 
trial court on the necessity of expert testimony, mentioned in 
dictum, should not extend to the failure to require medical 
causation testimony in Price's case. 
19 
3. Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc. — A case where the 
accident reconstruction testimony of a highway patrol officer was 
deemed inadmissible. The Court states: "There is no need for 
expert opinion with reference to facts involving commonplace 
16Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982). 
17415 P.2d 987 (Okla. 1966). 
1822 Utah 2d 154, 449 P.2d 996 (1969). 
1917 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
occurrences,M without holding that the reconstruction testimony 
was unnecessary. The complex medical causation issue in Price's 
case cannot be considered a "commonplace occurrence." 
Utah Power agrees that the jury was not bound to accept the 
testimony of any expert witness it did not believe, whether 
introduced by Price or Utah Power. Price had an obligation, 
however, to offer expert medical causation testimony, whether 
believed or not, in a complicated medical case such as this. A 
passing reference to an unspecified accident in a letter from Dr. 
Gaufin to Dr. Demman, without any statement of causation (Exhibit 
4) certainly does not supply such causation testimony. Neither 
do the statements of possible connections between the mule 
incident and the injuries, made by chiropractors Sanders and 
Thayn on cross-examination. These were not expressions by these 
doctors "in language which sufficiently represented their own 
best judgment to a reasonable certainty," as required by Utah 
i 21 law. 
The auto accident case from Kansas of Rowe v. Maule Drug 
22 Co., cited by Price, bears no resemblance to his own case. In 
Rowe, an orthopedic specialist called by the plaintiff was asked: 
Q. Doctor, based upon the historical 
information you received from the patient at the time 
of your examination, based further on your physical 
findings and examination of the patient, can you 
state with any medical certainty that this man did 
receive at least some aggravation to his back 
condition as a result of the accident? 
A. Yes, I believe I could make this statement, 
[reasons given] I would not say that the x-rays (sic) 
findings were a direct result of the accident but the 
20408 P.2d at 189. 
21State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 230 (Utah 1980) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
history is suggestive that the condition has worsened 
since the accident. 
Q. And consistently began as a result of the 
accident? 
23 A. Yes, I feel I could say that. 
An osteopath, called later by the plaintiff, testified: 
Q. . . . would it be consistent with your 
findings that the accident, which he complains about, 
was a considerable contributing factor to the 
disabilities which he suffers? 
[objection overruled] 
p-A. Yes, I think it would have a bearing on 
it. 
The Rowe court did not agree to characterize this as "mere 
possibility" testimony: 
We think this testimony amounted to an honest 
expression of professional opinion that there was a 
causal connection between the collision and the 
condition complained of. That is all that is or 
ought to be required. 
The Rowe medical testimony is far removed from Price's 
cross-examination of the chiropractors called to supply evidence 
of preexisting conditions: 
1. Dr. Sanders said it was possible that a severe strain or 
twist can aggravate a preexisting weakness (Tr. 177). 
2. Dr. Thayn, who had last treated Price in 1978 and who 
did not testify to any examination of Price or his records since 
well before the mule incident, testified hypothetically of a 
possible connection between a mule ride and a neck injury. (Tr. 
216-17). 
23413 P.2d at 106. 
25413 P.2d at 109. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Such testimony does not meet the Jarrell "best judgment to 
a reasonable certainty" standard. 
POINT 4 
The Court Committed Prejudicial Error and Violated 
Due Process in Refusing to Question Jury Panel Jtembers 
about Possible Prejudice Against Utah Power from 
Layoffs and Unemployment in the Coal Mining Industry and 
in Refusing to Grant a New Trial on this Issue 
(A Reply to Respondent's Point III) 
Utah Power does not argue on appeal the excessive nature of 
the $156,350 jury verdict rendered against it. No appeal is 
taken from the denial of its Rule 59(a) (5) motion (new trial for 
excessive damages). Utah Power's complaint with the jury is the 
screening process employed. The judge did not ask enough 
questions on voir dire to adequately probe potential bias against 
Utah Power. Several of Price's arguments, therefore, miss the 
point. 
It is true that the extent of voir dire is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court; but the exercise of this 
discretion should be viewed in light of the simplicity by which 
the problem could have been cured — by asking the panel one 
27 
brief, additional question. A party should not be forced to use-
its peremptory challenges without adequate knowledge of the panel 
members. 
Price suggests that because the judge excused some of the 
panel members on his own accord, he was not required to continue 
1980). 
(Utah 1981) . 
State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 230 (Utah 
See Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 
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to screen the rest with skill and care. That might be true if 
the judge's duty were satisfied by dismissing an arbitrary number 
of panel members for bias, but in our system of justice, we 
expect all seated jurors to be relatively free of bias and known 
well enough to enable counsel to exercise peremptory challenges 
intelligently. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in failing to 
grant a new trial on the issues of deficient voir dire and 
inadequate causation testimony. This Court is not precluded from 
ordering a new trial and should do so for the sake of substantial 
justice. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
Date: 29 O c f o b ^ > 9 Q £ 
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DISCHARGE SUMMARY 
PRICE, VICTOR 
AGS 65, MALE, WHITS 
ADUISSIOH: 
DISCHARGE: 
9/ 6/77 
«'25/77 
:<•- ibis 65 year old oule was admitted on 9/6/77 and released on 9/15/77 following an 
injury vhen a horse backed and ran right over him producing multiple injuries with a. 
fracture- of the right ulna and with a fracture of the left ulna and radius and also 
laceration of the scalp and multiple injuries. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Temp 
GENERAL: 
SKIN: 
HEENT: 
CHEST: 
LUNGS: 
CARDIOVASCULAR : 
BACK: 
EXTREMIT 
LYMPHATICS: 
NEUROLOGICAL: 
HOSPITAL COURSE: 
LABORATORY: 
X-RAYS: 
DIAGNOSIS: 
AM. 
Resp; 21" M.I II III 
A well nourished, slight obese male admitted to the hospital 
following MM accident when the horse went over him. 
Normal in appearance. No excoriations or dermatosis is present. 
Round and symmetrical. The eardrums are intact. He IMS a 
laceration of the scalp. Pupils are round and equal and react 
to light and accommodation. There is no nasal obstruction. 
Throat is normal in appearance. 
Equal expansion on both sides. Both sides symmetrical. He has 
marked pain due to breathing on the left side. Possible some 
fractured ribs. 
No fluid, no rales consolidation* 
Normal sinus rhythm. mj murmurs, no thrills, no arrhytmias. 
No deformity. 
He has a great deal of swelling and deformity of the left wri st • 
He has multiple contusions and also laceration of the scalp. 
No enlargement of the axillary or cervical lymph glands. 
All physiological reflexes are present* 
Uninventful. Reduction of the fracture was done, 
Urine, within normal limits with the exception of 4,5, to 7 white 
blood cells per high powered field. The WBC was 17,500. The 
hemoglobin 14.8 grs., hematocrit was 46%. Stabs. 13, Segs. 681 
Lymphs. 16, Monos. 2 
.Left wrist shows comminuted fracture of the distal r ariius wit i!"::i 
extension into the articular surface where there is a fracture 
of the ulnaz • styloid process at the base. 
Skull fracture, none present. Had a large lacei***™ *™ +**-
frontal area .and a possible fracture of ribs on the left side. 
Toe reduction was done and views of the left wrist shows the 
fracture of the distal radius. The cast has 2)een applied and 
shows a fracture relationship satisfactorily. Ulnar styloid 
. fractures also noted. Cast was applied a nd afte i: reduction . 
under general anesthesia. ..-..*•• 
The patient will see me again in the future and" the diagnosis 
was a fracture of the left wrist, multiple contusions a nd 
laceration of the scalp. 
LEHMAN, M.D. 
9/15/77 
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hi • . ! • : • u.i;, ' ! • • ' . . . • . 
met, vicjtfk '••*. MHI I I 
rUT.798 
DATE OF ADMISSION: febrnary 4, 1!V 
DATE CF DISCHARGE: February 10, IW'P 
,.*llf JORY; 
.^HMr. Price. 1 s a 69-year old cwntlt. ;U.MI V.IK< i ,i r..:h:; '. ;.f '•; 
Utah. 
UI1EF COMPLAINT: 
1) Weakness and atrophy and right arm muscles. 
2) Pain in neck. 
»• . *. • , h 
HOSPITAL COURSE: 
The patient was admitted to IIM• liospiIa 1. A myelogram war. p«%rfcn:uHi, flu re v:.is 
a large, extradural de l f t ! ,il II!•-1> on th" r i ; h t f an o|.{»-,»i>hvti- it-r^jii^n war. 
present «t other levels hut l l v s i r tlt^ crt ••••. Mr .il'.n l»n| (vicu ».•• •• i f u\:\%r rvuroj. thy 
lit the elbow. 
The patient was taken to the operating room lebruary 6, 19f'.2 and an anterior 
. cervical discectomy with mv^n root decompression and interbody fusion C5-5 
v.as performed. Following this operation and exploration with e/Urr.al ururclysis 
the ulnar r)Qr\9u on the right was performed. Pctopi rativrly the patient hr.d dr?fie 
well with numbness in the fourth and fifth finyers of his right hand iirprcvtd to 
almost normal. The aching that he had in his elbow was no lonner present. Patient's 
pain in his neck was significantly ir.prnvnl jl. the tin-* of cliM I»<M y. ir• - tr.e 
k;:pital. The pnlient reported thai, he \.%v. Ie:1inc; ir.ich h.l;-:i. • '•• ».|?. ;h ir> 
!he lic.cns, triceps ami 'jrip on the ritih v.rrr i;ri:.h;l »v, •1-/0. U .»-. iv a*»••••:'.;.' :••* 
!••'! firr.l dorsal and osseus i w t l e oil the ri«:hi. Sensory c-:•:.:..ii:.i: I.-N !•••••...!«.!. ilvi 
h/pjlutsia over the fourth arid filth fintjcrr. i iuht land and cvrr !!.»• M.. : ;r" IV-
H<;hfhand. 
The futures wore reiwvetl on the day of di'.duir'io. Tn.: hi. uvJ.. M • re v.-'-.rv 
cellulitis or infection present. Patient had a mild hoars cne:.* of his voice. 
LABORATORY DATA: 
Met. D^'.', white count S.H'Xi. mis,;!, r :•••-.--i. !;•!<;. i..-;?, /.'. „ \§\'. '. r,:.r::.\) t 
SKA 12 normal. Chest x-ray i.or:. il. . .X-r^y of the ri'rht ••ih.-.-t: cif-priMr.-te* r/;-? 
dunenerative joint dii-eaM? at Ihr »•!! .;, in fr-.c l-.n-r. i> ? ;•!c'lr r. .L1 •••;;-:. •'• .•'V.r.v.' 
prominent extradural defect on the ri»:»t • i'Je if CS-G. '.Gin:1 H i d i-.*'1'! :l '.'-7 •';: 
there is degenerative disc disease at 1.5-51. The EKG v.as within-nor;:*tI IHit'.. 
Pathology report came back fragments of intervertebral disc and cs*»:;>vlr. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
X 
:,.;. c;-u! IN 
01 OK 
IAGN0S1S: 
1) Acute 
2) Uliiiii* neuropathy with ei 
3) Degenerative arthritis. 
4) Arteriosclerotic VI' i * \ i i .» i * 
/ % ;.N. 
Dhtt iat gc! ft om 1 lie hosp i tal 
Return to my i if I ice in t\ m wuel ' • "I < i • H w: ;,! I ! ,4 \ iff x in «: :"!; 11 u„; • i ;:,: •> 
I n s t r u c t i o n s were g i v e n r e i )< i r d i no h i s d < t i v i t i e s , d o ' s ami d - j n ' : • : 
g i v e n a c e r v i c a l f rame and admonished nc. I to f l e x Ins r eck so ar to 
the chance of crushing the bone plug. 
MEDICATIONS: 
Multi-vitam I i 1 tail: • let q • J 
Darvocet N-100 1 tab le t pi i i , , 
I KG/ r ra 
i i ic t : 2- 10-82 
t rans: 2 11 82 
I yii'n 1i fi-ifif i i ~ ~ i IT 
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na J U t l Z — OATI JMl 
VuiOL, pw Jtona-
R.F.D. «2 - BOX 48 
PRICE, UTAH 84501 
Arnbulttory L J 
VAJIT TO EXAMINED, 
RfASON FOR CXAM . 
Cart • 
Report of Roentgenological Examination 
Wrwolchalr L J flown • J ™ * Hospital # 
Jlfllt-itoiL Iniartd 
<a-
,<< RADIOLOGY REPORT 
.V-j 
; * = • 
a •;• • v 
% • • 
t » 
. A 
I 
* ' 
*: 
VIEWS OF THE RIGHT ELBOW 
6hovs arthritic change and deformity consistent vith old tratsna. 
There are arthritic changes in the joints base. 
I don't see evidence of acute bony injury. 
There is considerable soft tissue swelling posteriorly. 
f\. 
'f 
r 
. — > « * # _ _ • • • _ 
M. t . Bauermcister M D 
RadkXoglti 
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• .36. William Anton Block Orangeville, Utah 
• -37. Kelly Jenkins Burnside Huntington, Utah 
•^38. Fred Marcus Gregersen Castle Dale, Utah 
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Rule 46 Excepuuns unnecessary. 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is 
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or 
sought, makes known, to the court the action which he desires the court to take 
or his objection to the action of the court and his ground therefor; and, if a party 
has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the 
absence of an objection, does not thereafter prejudice him 
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Rule 50. Motion for a Directed Verdict and for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
(a) Motion for Directed Verdict; When Made; Effect A party who moves for 
a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer 
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved 
the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. 
A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by 
jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A 
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The 
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without 
any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Whenever a motion 
for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any 
reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the 
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. 
Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a 
directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered 
thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion 
for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within ten 
days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance 
with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined 
with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict 
was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the 
judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the 
requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may 
direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or 
may order a new triaL 
(c) Same; Conditional Rulings on Grant of Motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for 
in subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on the 
motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted 
if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the 
grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the motion 
for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not 
affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial has 
been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the 
new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. 
In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the 
respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if the judgment 
is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with 
the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of Motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, 
assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate court 
concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether 
a new trial shall be granted. 
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R u l e I >'!) IN* y i ""I rials; t Amendments • :: f Ji idgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or 
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from, having a fair trial 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinarv e 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the appli-
cation, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the \ erdict c i : thei iec ision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law 
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application,, for a new trial is made 
under subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within, which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not 
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On Initiative of Court Not later than 10 days after entry ofjudgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion, of a, party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment A, motion to alter or amend, the 
judgment shall be served, not later than, 1 0 days after entry i >f the judgment. 
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VICTOR PRT^E , 
Plainti ff-Respondent, 
vs, 
UTAH POWER & ^x^iiT COMPAN Y, 
a Utah corporation, and 
DAVID Z SERAIlf 
De fendants-Appe1lar4 
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 ( •<?/ * F .-ike 
s t a t e s t h a t h e s e i: \ r e d t h e c o r r e c t < ] '- * r 
wCi 
ty, Uf-ah h4 : r , 
r s"e^ t c c p ^ ' fo3 lowing par ties by pis: ' : r.rr four i J \>"- -no 
in an enveIope addres sed tr-; 
Marlynn JS. 1.0^. , ..... 
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F.O. Box 1026 
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Telephone: {8 01 ) 637-2 690 
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and mat lino trie same, postage prepaid, on this 29th day of 
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